Securing India's North-East by G. Parthasarathy

Two major factors are crucial in the security of India's North-Eastern States. First, these States are landlocked. Their access to the sea and even trade and economic exchanges with other parts of India are thereby curtailed. Second, even access by land is often precarious, because access to these States from other parts of India is through the narrow 'Siliguri Corridor', which is vulnerable to Chinese pressure, especially as an aggressive China brazenly lays claim to Arunachal Pradesh, protesting against the visit of India's Prime Minister to that State. China's policies along our border cannot be wished away. Further endangering our North-Eastern security is Bangladeshi refusal to permit transit of Indian goods to the North-East, coupled with what is described as a "demographic invasion" of these States by Bangladeshi nationals, with separatist insurgents receiving support on Bangladeshi territory.

In these circumstances one cannot overestimate the importance of the agreement on the 'Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project' finalised during the visit of Myanmar's Vice-President Gen Maung Aye. This project, with an estimated investment of $ 135 million, will end the landlocked nature of our North-Eastern States, by connecting Mobu in Mizoram to the Bay of Bengal port of Sittwe in Myanmar, located barely 539 km from Kolkata. While Myanmar has cooperated with us in mounting military operations against Indian insurgent groups being infiltrated from Bangladesh, this project will secure its co-operation in dealing with what amounts to a virtual blockade of our North-Eastern States by Bangladesh. By gaining access to Sittwe port, India has also addressed its longstanding concerns about Chinese pressure on Myanmar to make this port available for its 'strategic corridor' along the Irrawady to the Bay of Bengal. This project has been handled more imaginatively than our unsuccessful and indeed amateur efforts to secure Myanmar gas from offshore fields in which GAIL and ONGC have equity stakes.

Gen Maung Aye has come at a time when the emerging contours of Myanmar's future political evolution appear to be taking shape. Having signed "standstill agreements" with virtually all ethnic armed groups, Myanmar's military rulers have ensured that apart from the Kachins operating on the Thai-Myanmar border, there is an end to ethnic insurgencies in the country. In addition, the military Government has announced that a Constitution finalised after 15 years of discussions by a National Convention (in which supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy initially participated) will be put for endorsement to a referendum, to be held next month. Unlike Myanmar's past Constitutions of 1947 and 1974, the new Constitution envisages, for the first time, a measure of regional autonomy, with provisions for elected Regional Councils. The May 2008 referendum is to be followed by a general election in 2010. Whether the ruling dispensation sticks to this schedule remains to be seen, as there are reports about differences within the ruling elite about this roadmap for constitutional change.

Does this mean that we are going to see full-fledged parliamentary democracy as we understand it soon in Myanmar? The Constitution envisages a dominant role for the 'Tatmadaw' (armed forces) "to be able to participate in the national political leadership role of the state". This is reflected in the powers the armed forces have been given to run their own affairs, including the budget, and in the extensive powers of the President, who will undoubtedly be drawn from the armed forces. Moreover, 25 per cent of all seats in the Union Parliament and Regional Assemblies have been allocated to armed forces personnel. Thus, Myanmar's transition to full-fledged parliamentary democracy is set to follow the path adopted over the past four decades by its two ASEAN neighbours - Indonesia and Thailand. It remains to be seen how Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD are accommodated in - or reconcile themselves to - this framework, where they will face stiff opposition from the Army backed Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). As things stand, Western pressures are unlikely to be able to deter the ruling dispensation from following this path, though one will have to see how far urgings by UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari and friendly neighbours like India can persuade the regime to make the process of political evolution more inclusive.

Apart from its bilateral dealings with Myanmar, New Delhi will have to play a more activist role in giving meaningful content to its engagement with South-East Asia through the Bay of Bengal Regional Grouping, BIMSTEC, which brings together Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka, with ASEAN members Myanmar and Thailand. Elimination of trade and investment barriers along our North-Eastern frontiers has to be an essential element in this effort and BIMSTEC is a crucial forum to achieve this. Procedures need to be simplified and existing trade barriers removed for border trade with Myanmar. Our private sector also should seek to invest in agricultural production in Myanmar. This will enable easy imports of rice and agricultural products for our North-East from Myanmar, rather than providing supplies, especially for the public distribution system, from distant parts of India. Moreover, we have thus far ensured, in cooperation with the Myanmar Government, that there is no large scale Chinese presence close to our border. This could well change if New Delhi dithers as it did on utilisation of Myanmar gas, in implementing the proposal for developing the hydro-electric potential of the Chindwin River, close to Myanmar's border with Manipur. Energy hungry China could well move in to get the project implemented to meet its needs if we continue to procrastinate.

New Delhi can derive some satisfaction that successive Governments in India have not allowed political populism to prevail over considerations of national security in dealing with Myanmar over the last 15 years. Strangely, our Communist parties purport to be champions of democracy in Myanmar, in contrast to their "hear no evil and see no evil" approach to Chinese repression in Tibet. China will, after all, be the principal beneficiary of strained India-Myanmar relations. But, while moving ahead with improving relations with Myanmar, India should urge the Myanmar Government to do more for people of Indian origin in that country, especially for the estimated half-a-million people of Indian origin who are still stateless. We do unfortunately bend backwards to help affluent Indians abroad, but pay less than adequate attention to the travails of the poor and the dispossessed.

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